A multi-agent dynamic game of experimentation is examined where players non-cooperatively search for a common unknown threshold. Time is discrete and players take turns in adjusting their individual level of performance. There is assumed to be a common threshold of performance below which a player suffers a (lump sum) cost of breakdown. Information is shared by all, and players start with a common prior with regard to the distribution of the threshold.
Introduction
Learning through experimentation is a common practice in many aspects of the economy. In the literature, a large number of models used the "bandit" framework that agents learn about the quality of one or several "arms" through a potential stochastic process (Cripps, Keller, and Rady (2005) , Bolton and Harris (1999) , Bonatti and Hörner (2011), etc.) . However, there are other situations in the economy where people need to learn about an unknown threshold rather than the prospect of a given arm. Whenever the reaction to a continuous action takes the all-or-none form, the threshold that triggers the discrete change in reaction is an important object to learn. Situations of this nature are common in our economy. Manufacturers try to pass some vague regulatory criteria by setting the quality of their products. Maintenance team, facing an unknown minimum level of effort to avoid disasters, provide hidden effort to control a production plant. Risk management sector of a bank struggle to find an optimal level of risky behavior to remain tolerable in the system when using their human capital and other resources to bring the risk under control.
In order to capture learning situations of this sort, I present a model that abstracts the key feature of the "binary reaction" out of reality: as the input (action) continuously changes, the output (consequence) has a discontinuous jump at some unknown threshold. Using terminology from the bandit literature, my model features a continuum of arms, although there are two important differences from that literature. First, the arms in my model are dependent in that if an arm is bad, then all arms below it are bad. Second, the continuum of arms in my work poses a "spatial" dimension that is the main object of learning. In an exponential bandit problem, the number of options to experiment on is finite, and learning is slow in the sense that it takes time for belief to evolve by the stochastic nature of the process. To some extent, this way of learning is "chronological", learning is slow and the key decision is when to stop. In contrast, learning on a specific arm is fast in my model as the pass/fail binary reaction is given instantaneously. Therefore, the time aspect of learning is degenerate but continuous action space slows down the learning. I call it "spatial" learning because the amount of learning depends on the step size down the spectrum of arms, and the critical decision is where to stop.
Specifically, I first consider a dynamic decision problem faced by a single player. In each period, she receives a fixed benchmark benefit, and chooses a level of costly performance (the higher performance, the larger the disutility). At the end of each period she receives a binary feedback: Good or Bad, as a step function of her latent action (performance). If the feedback is Bad, she suffers a lump-sum punishment. The threshold level of performance, dividing Good from Bad, is fixed from the beginning, but is unknown to the player. Therefore, the purpose of the player is to maximize intertemporal profit with the motivation to experiment on the threshold. The posterior belief is updated according to the occurrence of punishment. Solving the problem in closed-form, I find that when the time interval is sufficiently short, performance declines over time if punishment does not occur on path. The problem with the single player model is that, as period length tends to zero, the decline becomes so steep that the performance almost immediately drops to the long-run level without further decrease.
In stark contrast, multi-player games have qualitatively different dynamics. Suppose there are two players who can only adjust individual performance levels alternatingly, so a chosen action is committed for two periods. The only link between the players is information externality: the full history is shared as common knowledge, and thresholds they face are the same. The traditional oligopoly feature (competing for business) is assumed away for simplicity. I find that in such a two-player game, the time path of performance does not collapse when period length is infinitely short; instead, it declines smoothly over time. The limiting time path is derived in closed-form, where performance declines faster in the beginning and then slows down towards a long-run asymptotic level which depends on the severity of punishment and patience. Intuitively, the difference between one-player and two-player games is driven by the presence of informa-tion externality; taking a lower action, if successful, can benefit both players, but the increased risk of punishment is not shared. However, more subtle explanation than free-riding is needed because further increase in the number of players does not alter the dynamics drastically.
The paper connects to several branches of the existing literature. First, it belongs to the tradition of experimentation a la Rothschild (1974) . Later, exponential bandit (Cripps, Keller, and Rady (2005) , Bonatti and Hörner (2011) ) and Brownian bandit (Bolton and Harris (1999) , Moscarini (2005) ) were most extensively studied. This paper contributes to the literature with a less studied form of learning, where the slow part of the learning does not come from the time-consuming waiting for news, but is inherited from the continuum of actions available. Theoretically it takes forever to find the exact best action, so the question answered in my paper is where to stop, as opposed to when.
Second, the paper contributes to the studies of dynamic games. Admati and Perry (1991) and Matthews (2013) studied the dynamic problem of contribution to a public good, without uncertainty and learning. Maskin and Tirole (1988a,b) investigated a dynamic stationary duopoly game. Lancaster (1973) , Levhari and Mirman (1980) analyzed the dynamic game of the extraction of a common resource. My model fits well into this category of games, builds on the insight of Hellwig and Leininger (1988) , and establishes the existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium.
Moreover, the paper is closely related to three papers on spatial learning. Bonatti and Hörner (2013) considered a single player learning problem with respect to an unknown threshold, where action space is finite and the consequence of taking a too low action is a Poisson process. Callander (2011) featured a spatial learning in which the realization of each trial is a sample point on a path of Brownian motion. Rob (1991) investigated an industrial organization model where a continuum of firms collectively learn the position of a kink on the demand curve by decisions of entry and exit. My work models explicitly the strategic interaction between several players learning the same object, and demonstrats that the dynamics are totally different for single player and multi-player games.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the settings and assumptions of the game. Section 3 simplifies the game to a standard dynamic game of perfect information through a sequence of arguments. Section 4 solves for the equilibria of the one-player decision and of the two-player game. Section 5 extends the game in four directions. Section 6 concludes.
Model Setup

Game Basics
Consider an infinite horizon game with discrete time and N players. For ease of exposition, I describe the game for N = 2 here, but it readily generalizes to any finite number of players. In each period t (with fixed length ∆), both players enjoy a default benefit p∆. Meanwhile, they alternately adjust their individual levels of performance x it ∈ X ≡ R + , i = 1, 2. Specifically, in odd-numbered periods player 1 chooses x 1t with per-period cost e(x 1t )∆, and commits it to two periods; in even-numbered periods the choice belongs to player 2 who faces the same cost function. e(·) is strictly increasing with e(0) = 0 and lim x→∞ e(x) = ∞. Without loss of generality, one can always assume e(x) = x by proper change of measure on the action space 1 . Note that benefit and cost are both scaled with period length ∆.
Threshold for Binary Outcomes
Aside from the basic payoffs of the game, there is an ingredient to prevent low performances: at the end of each period, the performance level is subject to a pass/fail check. Formally, z it = 1{x it < c} is the value of a one-step function with 1 We can redefine the action (performance) to be the cost, then by definition e(x) = x. cutoff c, mapping performance levels into binary outcomes. If z it = 1 for player i, then she suffers a lump sum punishment L at the end of that period. Here comes a crucial assumption: the time-invariant threshold c is unknown for both players in the beginning, and they share common prior with regard to the distribution of c, which is F (c). The density function f (·) = F (·) is positive on an interval support (0, x 0 ) 2 . Unless noted otherwise, I assume that x 0 p, so that staying at an unprofitable performance level is absolutely safe. This simplifying assumption trivially addresses the concern of participation constraint; a non-negative value for staying in the game is always guaranteed 3 .
Information Structure
Let
Beginning with the common prior, players Bayes-update their beliefs about the distribution of c. Given the simple structure of the game, updating process is a mere truncation of the existing belief. Suppose in the beginning of period t the old belief is
). An action outside the support provides no information. In this way, the belief can be summarized by two states m t = max i=1,2;s<t {x is : z is = 1} and M t = min i=1,2;s<t {x is : z is = 0}, i.e., the highest unsafe and lowest safe level of performance, respectively. The posterior is denoted by F (·|m t , M t ). As mentioned before, the game starts with states (0, x 0 ).
2 It is without loss of generality to set the lower bound of the support to be 0, because a game with flow benefit rate p and prior distribution F (c) on support (x l , x 0 ) is analytically equivalent to a game with flow benefit p − x l and prior distribution F (c + x l ) on support (0, x 0 − x l ).
3 The case where x 0 > p with free exit is considered in Subsection 5.4.
Solution Concept
Each player i (i = 1, 2), being risk neutral, aims to maximize her intertemporal profit discounted by δ ≡ e −r∆ ∈ (0, 1):
where the expectation is taken over the random variable c.
I concentrate on Markov perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. By definition, if in period t it is time for player i to adjust, then x it must depend on states (m t , M t ) only, but not on other payoff-irrelevant histories.
Transforming the Problem
The game is not easy to solve for three reasons. First, the state variables are related to past actions in a non-differentiable way (recall that m t and M t are max or min of some set). Second, there are two state variables to keep track of. Finally, it is stochastic in nature, the outcome of which in each period depends on the realization of the random variable z it . Fortunately, the transformations of the problem done in this section crack these difficulties.
Monotone History
One can easily convince herself that when it is i's turn to move in period t, x it M t in any Markov perfect equilibrium. It is true because a performance above M t leads to no more learning than staying at M t while costing more, hence is strictly dominated.
Conversely, as long as the period length is small compared to the size of the punishment, equilibrium also requires x it > m t when i is the mover in period t. Indeed, if the punishment is severe enough, then no one should deliberately trigger it because again, no more learning happens than staying at M t , while the myopic savings on the cost does not compensate the lumpy loss.
Formally, we have the following claims.
Lemma 1 In a Markov perfect equilibrium, it is never optimal for a current mover to set x it > M t . Moreover, it is never optimal to set x m t when L > M t ∆.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the rest of the paper it is always assumed that ∆ is sufficiently small so that the condition for the second part of Lemma 1 is satisfied. Without loss of generality, we can restrict x it ∈ (m t , M t ] for the current mover i. A direct implication from Lemma 1 is that we can replace the pair of state variables with past actions.
Corollary 2
In a Markov perfect equilibrium, if no punishment has occurred so far, then (m t , M t ) = (0, x −i,t−1 ); if a punishment just occurred for the first time, then (m t , M t ) = (x −i,t−1 , x i,t−2 ).
The dynamics of performance after a punishment occurs is not interesting, because as we will soon find in the next subsection, the experimentation will stop after hitting the threshold for the first time provided that the period length is sufficiently short.
Where to Stop
In this subsection we will focus on the dynamics before any punishment strikes. First of all, denote the current states as (m, M ) (time subscript suppressed). Next, define the equilibrium value function of the current mover by v(m, M ), and the value function of the non-mover by w(m, M ). The Bellman equations are:
The first equation is the recursive optimization problem faced by the current player.
Faced with states (m, M ), she chooses the current action x in order to maximize the sum of expected current payoff,
, and the expected continuation payoff. In the latter, depending on the realization of punishment, the player enters the next period facing states (m, x) or (x, M ) as a non-mover. The second equation describes the value function of the currently inactive player, where x emphasizes the fact that it is the argmax in the first equation, chosen by her opponent. It has similar interpretations except for the lack of direct risk of punishment.
Even if the past realizations of z it are a sequence of zeros, the players will never want to lower performance level all the way down to 0, because in later stages the conditional density of the threshold is so high that it is not worth the risk to experiment even for a bit. The following results establish that the process of experimentation stops if and only if the distance between the state variables is small enough (below a critical distance).
As a technical restriction that guarantees well-behaved equilibrium, I assume that the prior probability distribution F (·) satisfies Assumption 1
is strictly increasing in c for all a ∈ [0, 1].
This requirement on F is a version of increasing hazard rate condition. Note that in mechanism design literature it often appears as special cases where a = 0 or a = 1. Therefore, it is not too restrictive, admitting many regular distribution functions.
Lemma 3
In a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for fixed ∆, if M is sufficiently close to m, i.e.,
, then both players will choose to stay at M . Hence, no further drop in performance.
Building on Lemma 3, an important conclusion is that when period length is small, the amount of experimentation M − x is also small, and consequently in case of a punishment, the distance between the new state variables will be too short to allow for further experimentation. This is summarized below.
Lemma 4 Consider a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. If the period length ∆ is sufficiently short, then both players will always choose x = M (the lowest safe performance) after a punishment at the first opportunity. In other words, there will be no further drop in performance after one punishment.
Proof. See Appendix. Now that the continuation play after a punishment is trivialized, we can justifiably focus on the dynamics before any punishment, and this considerably simplifies the analysis. Recalling the Bellman equations, we can replace both w(x, M ) and v(x, M ) with
In a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium, it is convenient to denote R(m, M ) as the policy function of the current player facing states (m, M ), i.e., the argmax of the first Bellman equation. The monotonicity of R with respect to its second argument is established below by the standard IC approach.
Lemma 5
If time interval ∆ is sufficiently small, then in a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium the reaction function R(m, M ) is increasing in M .
Proof. If ∆ is small enough, then according to Lemma 4, both players should revert to the lowest safe action after punishment. Hence, suppose x = R(m, M ) and x = R(m, M ), then IC requires
and
, and then add them up:
If, in addition to the requirement in Lemma 4, ∆ is small so that δ >
With the above results, it is now possible to present a stronger version of Lemma 3, indicating that experimentation should terminate even for M and m that are further apart.
Lemma 6 (Stronger version of Lemma 3) In a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for fixed ∆, if
To bound the equilibrium behavior from the other side, the next lemma specifies conditions that players should not stop experimentation.
Lemma 7
In a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium for fixed ∆, if
, the current mover will choose an action strictly lower than M . Hence, the performance should go down in that case.
Note that Lemmas 6 and 7 pose a tight condition under which R(m, M ) < M . Putting the above results together, we are able to give a characterization of the equilibrium strategy R(m, M ).
Proposition 8 Let M
* be the unique solution M * for
. The equilibrium reaction function R(m, M ) satisfies:
(ii) R(m, M ) is increasing in M and is continuous at M * .
Proof. (i)
The only thing left out by Lemmas 6 and 7 is the knife-edge case when M = M * . From Lemmas 5 and 6, it is obvious that
for all M < M * . Take limit of the above as M ↑ M * and we get R(m, M * ) = M * .
(ii) For all M > M * , we have
Take limit of the above as M ↓ M * and we get continuity. That R(m, M ) is increasing in M is already obtained from Lemma 5.
Reforging the Value Functions
Thanks to the simplification so far, we know that dynamics after a punishment is represented by constant performance. Before any punishment occurs, the lower state m is always at its starting value 0, so the only "active" state variable is M .
The value functions are not separable at the moment. However, a simple transformation can make them separable while still preserving the order. Define
and since
is still the argmax of the first equation. Now the game satisfies all requirements of a separable sequential game. Meanwhile, the stochastic nature of the original game is no longer important, and we are actually dealing with a game of perfect information.
Characterizing the Equilibrium
Before characterizing the Markov perfect equilibrium for multiple players, it is useful to take a detour in subsection 4.1 to solve the single player decision problem first. This serves as a good benchmark for comparison.
Special Case: Single Player
In a single player optimization problem, the only player can set a new performance level in each period. To make the severity of punishment comparable with the two-player game, we set the lump sum to be L(1 + δ) instead of L. The reason for this rescaling is that in a two-player game the action, and hence the possible punishment, lasts for two periods.
Assuming short period length ∆ as usual, the Bellman equation for the single player is:
and the closed form solution for uniform distribution is described below.
Proposition 9 When ∆ is sufficiently small, there is a unique solution to the single player problem. If F is uniform, the closed-form solution is 
is the same, and R(m, M ) is increasing in M . Second, despite the complex expression for α, it is a constant between 0 and 1, giving rise to a piecewise linear policy. Finally and most importantly, when ∆ → 0, we have
This is interesting because although the performance is decreasing in each period, the "step length" (M − R(m, M )) is of order √ ∆, so the time path of perfor-mance declines infinitely steeply in the beginning when ∆ → 0. It does not settle at asymptotic level x * in finite periods, but still, it takes arbitrarily little real time to reach a performance level above x * . Hence, we can approximately claim that the decision with single player will not feature gradual decline in performance in the near-continuous time limit.
As is evident from Figure 1 , a smaller ∆ leads to a policy function that is closer to 45 degree line, but to a time path of performance that is much steeper. In some sense, this indicates that the gap between the policy and 45 degree line is still too "big" relative to ∆.
Multiple Players
Now we are back in the multi-player game. The basic trade-off that the current player faces is three-fold. By lowering the chosen action x by one unit, she saves exactly one unit of current cost of effort, explores potential savings for the future, but she also subject herself to proportionally larger risk of punishment. Among them, the second force changes when we move from a single player decision to a multi-player game, due to the information externality. By shading the experimentation (choosing a higher action), the current player sheds the burden of learning to her opponent to some extent. Qualitatively, this leads to a slower learning process just like any canonical free-riding problem; however in this model the change in the process is drastic, from an instant jump to a gradual process.
A closed-form solution is no longer available, but as we will see, there is a simple closed-form limit for policy function, value functions, and time path of performance when period length tends to zero. Before analyzing the limiting behavior, we first guarantee the existence of a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 10 When ∆ is sufficiently small, there always exists a symmetric pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium.
Having ensured existence, here comes the main result of the paper: the limiting behavior of policy, values, and time path when ∆ tends to zero.
As ∆ → 0, the limiting policy satisfy:
To see a heuristic derivation of the main result, let us take the uniform distribution F for simplicity. Consider a ∆ close enough to zero and expand the Bellman equations (4) and (5). The results in Proposition 11 simplifies to the following when F is uniform:
First of all, noting that x is the argmax in (4), we subtract (4) from (5) to get
where the first argument of V and W is suppressed for simplicity, and ∆ x ≡ x−M is the change in the state variable. From the proof of Lemma 4 we know that ∆ x = O(∆), so rearranging the above yields
The FOC of (4) with respect to x reads
, we obtain from the above that
and solving it gives
Note also that when M is small, there is no further drop in performance, and
Hence, value matching and smooth pasting gives
so that
and taking the limit of ∆ → 0 gives (7).
To obtain (6), we can expand (5).
Plugging the expression for W (M ) into the above, we obtain
, then we can write a sequence of difference equations: Adding them up and taking the limit ∆ → 0 produces
for the case that a punishment never occurs. If, instead, a player gets hit by the punishment in period t, then x t < c ≤ x t−1 , and both players will stay at x t−1 forever. Taking ∆ → 0 will bring x t−1 arbitrarily close to x t , so that x t−1 → c. In summary,
The following result summarize the asymptotic behavior of the learning process.
Corollary 12
As ∆ tends to zero, (ii) When c < M 0 , the performance level monotonically and asymptotically settles at M 0 .
It never reaches M 0 in finite time, and the learning process never stops completely.
This corollary means that although the incentive to explore the threshold is always present, players will eventually leave a "safety margin" below which there is no more learning by lowering performance. When the actual realization of c is low, players will not bother to lower the action all the way down to trigger it. Consequently, eventual learning is not achieved in this case.
The following result is the comparative statics.
Corollary 13
The time path of performance decreases more slowly and ends at a higher asymptotic level if the punishment is more severe or players are less patient.
This corollary has an intuitive interpretation. With larger L, the incentive for saving current cost is unchanged, but the other two both move in the direction that favors higher action (less experimentation). The learning also terminates at a higher level x * because the balancing point of the three incentives moves upward.
Similarly, with less patience, learning for future cost-saving is less important, and players should display more myopia and refrain from exploration. for ∆ very small. As ∆ tends to zero, the policy function converges to the 45 degree line just as in the case of single player. However, a big difference is that at x * , the policy here is tangent to the 45 degree line, as opposed to the kink in the 1-player decision. In a sense, the gap between the policy and the 45 degree line is of second order in the multi-player game, while it is of first order in the single player one, and that explains the difference of speed of decline on the time path.
It is interesting to compare the properties of the equilibrium with that of bandit and that of war of attrition. In a canonical bandit problem (Cripps, Keller and Rady (2005) ), a single player experiments on the risky arm until the posterior reaches a critical level, while multiple players feature the free-riding problem and lead to vanishing cooperation when the posterior is close to the critical level. In my model, however, players do not choose the scale of operation, but the "step size" down the spectrum of arms. Single player game leads to instant jump while multi-player game gives the smoothly declining performance. Of course, there are some similarities, such as vanishing learning near the critical posterior and non-achievable asymptotic learning.
In the war of attrition literature (Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Abreu and Gul (2000) ), rent dissipation is usually inevitable, in the sense that the equilibrium payoff is the same as the loser in the beginning. My work also has such a feature, where the value function converges to the single player value when ∆ → 0. From the perspective of a single player, an additional player benefits her in the sense of information externality, but the flip side of the coin is the free-riding problem that slows down the learning process to the extent that the delay in learning exactly offsets the benefit. Unlike war of attrition, asymptotic learning is not possible in my model.
Extensions
More Players
With N > 2 players, the game is similarly defined and each player's action is committed to N periods. In order to do comparative statics for N , it is suitable to rescale L to
1−δ N so that the severity of punishment is exactly the same for any N . with uniform distribution. As a counterpart of the main proposition, we have
As expected, the more players, the more prominent the free-riding effect. Seeing from the above formula, a game with N players has the effect of stretching the time axis by a factor of 2(N −1) N . Intuitively, the information externality slows down the learning process, but it does not change the extent of asymptotic learning. Notably, while the change of time path from one player to two players is drastic, any additional players beyond two do not change the qualitative nature of the equilibrium. See Figure 3 for the time paths of games with two, four, and infinitely many players.
Changing the Game Sequel
To check robustness of the model against different micro details of the game sequel, I consider variations in two directions.
First, consider asymmetric timing of the period grids. Borrowing Rubinstein's (1982) terms, we let the two players have different "bargaining power" in that the strong player delays more before making her move. For example, the period length when the weak player moves is 2∆, interspersed by periods of length ∆ when the strong player moves. Another way to model such asymmetry is to fix period length ∆, and to let the weak player take two consecutive actions before the strong player moves once. It turns out that although the policy functions become asymmetric and depend on the game structure, the time path and the value functions converge to the same limit as the symmetric case when ∆ → 0. The strong player moves less frequently, but at the same time, her equilibrium policy stipulates a larger decrease in performance, offsetting the asymmetry.
Second, consider a game of simultaneous moves instead of that of alternating moves. It turns out that each stage game only has two asymmetric pure strategy equilibria. At the beginning of each period, both players use a public randomization device to decide which equilibrium to choose, i.e., who moves down and who stays. In such a game, again, the value functions and time path converge to the same limit. 
Alternative Punishment Structure
Here we consider a different form of punishment. Instead of collecting a lumpsum fine of L, the punishment is a warning along with probability q of shutting down. Hence, the realization of z it is known but the actual enforcement of shutting down is random. In this case, the size of the punishment is endogenous, equalling probability q times the future value W .
As is evident from Figure 4 , the time path is infinitely steep when M = p. The reason is that if a threshold is near p, then the continuation value is near zero anyway, and the resulting severity of the punishment is so low that players are willing to take larger steps.
Participation Constraint
If the game starts with x 0 > p, the players may end up with a threshold higher than the flow benefit p. In such a situation, if players do not have the liberty of exit, then the previous analysis carries over. However, if players can opt to stop playing freely, then participation constraint becomes a concern.
In the case where only ex ante IR is the relevant constraint, players can decide whether to start the game, but cannot exit ex post when they are stuck with c > p. The dynamics after the initial decision is exactly the same as those characterized in the main part, except that players will start the game only if x 0 exceeds p by not too much. Specifically, in the uniform case,
That is, for some range of x 0 larger than p, the players find it worthwhile to start the learning process because of the option value, although a myopic player should opt out.
In the case where both ex ante and ex post IR's are relevant, players behave differently when M > p. With free exit in ex post sense, the players can choose to leave the game if a punishment occurs with x > p, rather than suffering a negative flow profit forever. Such an option is valuable to the players, and the learning process is expedited compared to the ex ante IR case. The limiting solutions are
The limiting time path has a closed-form solution, but is too complicated to display here. However, some observations are available. First, the cutoff
> p, which is again above p. Second, the performance declines faster than the benchmark case when M > p, but returns to normal when M < p. The difference comes from the additional option value when ex post exit is made possible. See Figure 5 for illustration.
Conclusion
In a dynamic game with multiple players experimenting on an unknown threshold, the features of the dynamics depend on the extent of information externality, the severity of punishment, and patience. For the extreme case with only one player, the time path of performance collapses to an instant jump followed by constant in the near-continuous time limit. In contrast, for games with at least two players, the time path is gradual and smooth, settling down at the same asymptotic level. The long-run performance level depends on the size of punishment and patience, while the speed of decline changes with the number of players. If the unknown threshold has a low realization, then on equilibrium path there is no punishment happening. Otherwise, punishment occurs in finite time, and then the decrease of performance stops immediately. The shape of the time path is robust to fine details of the game sequel.
It is possible to discuss welfare in a mechanism design or optimal regulation framework based on these results, using punishment structure as the choice variable.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Suppose that x it > M t occurs in equilibrium. Now consider deviating to x it = M t instead. This leads to a total saving of (x it − M t )∆(1 + δ) in two consecutive periods. However, the continuation game starting in period t + 1 will begin with state (m t , M t ), since excessively high performance contributes no new information about the threshold. Hence, the firm should profitably adjust x down to M .
Suppose that x it < m t occurs in equilibrium, and we still consider a deviation to x it = M t . This costs the player an extra (M t − x it )∆(1 + δ) in two consecutive periods, but avoids punishment of L(1 + δ) in those periods. Note that the continuation game starting in period t + 1 will begin with state (m t , M t ) in both cases, since excessively low performance does not provide new information on the threshold either. When L > M t ∆, the deviation is profitable because
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. By Lemma 1, it is without loss of generality to consider x ∈ (m, M ] only. I prove by contradiction. Suppose that for M and m such that
, the symmetric MPE still requires R(m, M ) = x < M , where R(·, ·) is the reaction function.
Then, the expected payoff from the hypothetical equilibrium is
We can think of a way of deviation: instead of setting x as designated by the equilibrium, we set performance at M , waiting for the opponent to set performance at x. This relies on both the symmetry and the Markovian nature of the equilibrium, since the opponent, facing the same state, should choose the same optimal action required by the equilibrium. After that, we ask the firm to follow the same action x at the next opportunity. From then on, do as the equilibrium asks. By Markovian nature, the subgame from then on is no different from the subgame from the original equilibrium, although coming with 2 periods late. The payoff of such a deviation is
If the equilibrium really asked x < M , then the above deviation should be unprofitable, meaning
To make progress, we need to bound w(m, x) from above. Define Q(x) ≡
. Suppose we already obtain a lower bound Q for Q(x) associated with undominated action, so that
. In other words, the highest speed of lowering performance is
be smaller than the imaginary case where performance is declining with highest speed consistent with undominated strategies, while lump sum punishment is waived. So,
Plugging (12) into (11) yields
The above inequality is complicated, but it is easy to verify that it holds for x = M . It is ambiguous whether it holds for
simple differentiation with respect to Q tells us that if it is violated when Q → 1, then it is violated for all Q < 1.
To check whether (13) is violated for
so that (13) simplifies to
which is violated by assumption. So for any Q < 1,
is ruled out as a dominated strategy. By continuity of the left hand side of the inequality (13), there exists a larger lower bound Q ∈ (Q, 1) such that
Now with a tighter lower bound for Q(x), we can accordingly obtain a tighter upper bound for w(m, x) just as inequality (12) does, except that Q is replaced with the larger Q . By Lemma 1 we know that Q(x) ∈ (0, 1], so we can start with Q 0 = 0, and continue this iteration of deleting dominated actions, resulting in an increasing sequence of Q n , n = 1, 2, · · · that does not converge below 1. Hence, taking limit as n → ∞, we get 1 Q(x) 1, i.e., x = M .
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Let Q 0 = 0, then according to the Proof of Lemma 3, we have
which means that starting from the beginning with upper bound M , the equilibrium "step length" M − x in performance decline is smaller than
.
Also from the Proof of Lemma 3, if the "step length" is below
, then in case of a punishment, the remaining distance between the upper and lower limits will be small enough to guarantee constant performance. To ensure that, a sufficient condition is
L ∆ Note that as functions of ∆, both sides of the above inequality are continuous. As ∆ → 0, the left hand side is approaching 0 while the right hand side is converging to Lr. Hence for ∆ small enough, the above inequality is satisfied and there will be no further decline in performance after punishment.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof.
Step 1: Before proving the lemma, we first need to show that the value function for the current mover, v(m, M ), is decreasing in M .
Suppose M < M . Given state (m, M ), the equilibrium gives the continuation play x 1 , x 2 , · · · , where
Now consider a deviation of the current player under state (m, M ). Instead of playing x 1 , x 3 , x 5 , · · · , she plays x 1 , x 3 , x 5 , · · · , the same sequence as starting from (m, M ). Since the distribution of c under state (m, M ) FOSD that under state (m, M ), it is immediate that the payoff of the deviating sequence under state (m, M ), U (m, M ; {x k }), is greater than the equilibrium sequence under state
Step 2: Now we can move on to prove the lemma.
The right hand side of (16) is bounded above by its maximum over the sequence of choice variables x 2 , x 4 , · · · , subject to
which means that the objective is always convex in
Hence its maximum is obtained at either
, and
which contradicts the condition of this lemma:
. Therefore, the optimizer should be x 2n+2 = m + Q 0 (x 2n − m) for all n 0. Finally, the optimized value of the right hand side of (16) is
So, using the tighter bound w(m, x) < 
, then
The remaining iterating steps are exactly the same as in the proof of Lemma 3.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. Again, we use proof by contradiction. Suppose towards contradiction that given the state (m, M ), a symmetric MPE requires x = M , then by symmetry the sequence of qualities will be constant at M from now on. The continuation payoff of the current mover from this hypothetic equilibrium is
Now consider a possible deviation. The player can instead choose x < M this time, and stay at x forever if no punishment and stay at M forever if otherwise.
The payoff is
If the payoff of such a deviation is higher than the equilibrium one, then the action x = M must not be part of an equilibrium.
L ∆ and x → M , then the above (19) holds. By continuity in x, even if x is slightly lower than M , (19) still holds. That means, the current player can obtain higher payoff than equilibrium by at least slightly shading the performance.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. Existence: by guessing and verifying. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. The existence is guaranteed by virtue of Hellwig and Leininger (1988) . Their Theorem 1 states that in a dynamic game with perfect information and finite players, if Backward Separability Assumption (BSA), Recursive Forward Separability Assumption (RFSA), and Regularity Assumption (RA) are all satisfied, then there exists a measurable pure strategy MPE. Now I check these assumptions one by one.
BSA: For any sequence of play (· · · , x t−1 , x t , x t+1 , · · · ), the current player's payoff can be written as
Iteration over t gives the sequence expression for U t . Past history (x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , · · · ) is summarized by state variable M t = x t−1 . The state evolves according to M t+1 = min{M t , x t } = x t . So BSA is satisfied.
